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I .  Introduction 
This study began as a survey of the literature on institu­
tional change as it related to research and development. Since 
the s urvey was to exclude the literature on patents and on industrial 
organization, it was completed very quickly. That literature is 
practically nonexist ent. The relationship, however, remains a n  
interesting one. There is a significant and growing body o f  litera­
ture that bears on the theory of institutional change. 1 In addition
economic historians have assigned technical change a central role 
in their studies of economic growth, and have produced an extensive 
literature of the history of invention and innovation. Since institu­
tional change is by its very nature a long-term proce s s ,  work in 
economic history provides a laboratory for the study of that proce s s .  
This s urvey u s e s  some o f  the recent developments in the theory of 
economic change to exa1nine more traditional work by economic 
historians in the hope of providing some insight into the relation­
ship between institutional structures and technical progre ss. 
1.  Lance E. Davis and Douglas C. North, Institutional Change 
and American Economic Growth ( Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge 
Univer sity Pre s s ,  1971). See also, J, Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 
The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Pre!!is, 1962), 
and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mas s . :  
lfarvard University P r e s s ,  1965). 
There is no attempt to provide conclusive answers. Instead the 
purpos e  is to generate a few tentative hypotheses and to suggest 
some areas where further research might provide more concrete 
results. The paper is 'in three parts. The first attempts to cast 
the problem in a framework that i s  amenable to the theory and 
to the data provided by the economic historians. The second 
surveys some portions of the economic hi.story literature that 
appear relevant. The third presents a few observations suggested 
by the history and outlines areas for further research. 
II. The Problem and the E coo.omic Historians 
D e spite the number o.f pages that have been written on the 
subject, the theory of technical change is not well worked out and 
even the taxonon<y is not precise. It is possible to define technical 
progress as the force that accounts for changes in the level of 
income that cannot be explained by changes in measurable inputs.  2 
That such a definition is precise, one cannot argue; however, if the 
problem involves explaining those forces, that definition is hardly 
helpful. Moreover, this ex po�t definition has taken on a life of 
its own, a life that seems to mask the need to push behind that 
definition to a study of the causes of technical progre s s .  For those 
that do choose to look for causes, the analysis is built on concepts, 
2 
like, for example, invention and innovation. But in this instance {and per­
haps, in g eneral) differences between the two are seldom specified 
and when specified seldom operational. To Schumpeter, inventions 
are the discovery of new techniques while innovation is the act of 
3 applying those techniques to economic production. The acts are 
2. Edward Fulton Denison, The Source s  of Economic Growth in
the United States and the Alternatives Before Us (New York: Comrnittee 
for Economic Development, 1962). 
3 .  Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An 
Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Interest and the Business Cycle (Can<bridge, 
Mass . :  Harvard University Pres s ,  1 9 1 1 ) .  
sepa rable and Schumpeter 1 s theory turns on that distinction, 
Inventions occur randomly over ti.me but innovations are concen;­
trated in periods of low uncertainty and explain the di.stLnctive 
cyclical nature of growth. Any examination of the real world, 
however, shows that invention and innovation are frequently insep­
arable and at times indistinguishable. Schumpeter may be excused 
because he wrote half a century ago but recent work has helped 
little if at all. It is pos sible to talk precisely about shifts in and 
movements along specified production functions , but in practice, it 
is difficult to distinguish one from another. Moreover, Salter has 
shown that the concept of a well specified production function has 
few empirical counte rparts, 4 Even if one is willing to accept the 
traditional formulation as useful, it helps little in understanding 
technical change that takes the form of new products rather than 
. 5 improved proc e s s e s .  
3 
In the course of this review no attempt is made to distinguish 
between inventions and innovations nor to build a taxonomy that per-
mits product innovation .to the treated syrnn1.etrically with process 
innovation. (This failure leads to both confusion and ambiguity, but 
it also suggests the pos sible productivity of research directed toward 
these basic questions. )6 Instead, the concern is with institutional 
structures and the as sociated rates of technical change defined to 
include both changes in technique and the introduction of new products. 
It is necessary, however, to realize that observed rates rnay be 
attributed to differences in the rates of production of new proc e s s e s  or 
products, to differences in the rate of diffusion of products and proce s s e s  
or t o  a combination o f  the two. 
4. W .  E .  Salter, Producti.vity and Technical Change (Cambridge,
Mass . : Cambridge Unive rsity Press,  1968). 
S. Edward Ames and Nathan Rosenberg, 11The Enfield Arsenal in 
Theory and History, " Economic Journal 78 (December 1968). 
6. G erald Flueckiger,  110bservation and Measurement of Technical 
Change, 11 Explorations in Economic 1-Iistory 9 #2 ·(Winter 1 97 1 -2). 
Although this iocus attempts to fine s se the problem of 
operational definitions, the avoidance is more apparent than real. 
In the literature the distinction between product and process inno­
vation is fre quently implicit, a.nd from an analytical point of view 
some distinction is important. Any new process or product involves 
a certain amount of technological uncertainty, but a new product 
involves not only technological but also market uncertainty. As 
long as the innovator is his own consumer, the market uncertainty 
is reduced or perhaps eliminated. Empirically, however, it i s  
very difficult t o  distinguish between a product and a process inno­
vation. In the case of the machine tool industry, for example, 
textile firms at first produced speciaf,ized tools as modifications 
of existing equipment ( clearly a process innovation) and then 
gradually began to invent and market more general machines 
(cl�arly new products). 7 It is, however, almost impossible to
identify the point in development at which process changes become 
product changes .  It probably rnakes sense, therefore, to focus not 
on the proc e s s -product distinction but on the question of the degree 
of market uncertainty; and it appears that the literature can be more 
easily interpreted i f  the distinction is made in this manner. 8 
4 
7. George S. Gibb, Tha Saco- Lowell Shops : Textile Machineu 
Building in New England, 181 3--1949 (Cambridge, Mas s . : Harvard 
University Pres s ,  1950}. See also, Duncan M. McDougall, 11Machine 
Tool Output 1861-1910," Purdue Faculty Papers in Economic HistoD::_ 
1956-1966, (Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. , 1967), and Nathan 
Rosenberg, 1'Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 
1840-1910," Journal of Economic History 4 (December 1963), pp. 414-446. 
8. W. Paul Strassman has studied a series of nineteenth century
te chnological innovations. in light of this question. His method involves 
distinctions between various types of risk ( e . g. , production, timing 
consumer) and their possible influence upon the decisions of innovators/ 
businessmen during this period. See W. Paul Strassman, Risk and 
Technological Innovation: American Manufacturing Methods During the 
Nineteenth Century, (Ithaca, N·ew York: Cornell University Pre s s ,  1959). 
s 
Given these caveats about taxonomy, let us turn to the 
questions of alternative institutional arrangements and the 
governmental policies that have affected the rate at which these 
institutions produce technology. Economic history contains examples 
of governmental institutional arrangements that have acted directly 
on research output, that have affected research output by altering its 
p rofitability, and that have indirectly affected the profitability of 
expenditures on research and development. At times government 
has affected output by acting as a consumer of research and at 
other tlmes they have socialized the research function. Profitability 
has been affected by the innovation of policies that guarantee markets 
for new products, by patents and other devices that confer some 
monopoly profits on the innovating firm, and by indirect subsidization 
of research and development when that activity was a joint product 
with government expenditures made for other purposes. F inally, 
there have been institutional changes that have promoted joint 
research, granted exemptions from anti-trust prosecution or 
preferential tax treatment, enacted laws protecting innovating firms 
from attacks by other institutions, and reduced information costs.  
While economic history provides numerous examples of 
alternative institutional structures, economic historians have seldom 
directed their research in that di.rection. Substantial work has, 
however, been focused on trends and fluctuations in innovative 
and/o r  inventive activity, and a portion of this conventional wisdom 
i s  relevant to a discussion of institutional productivity. Schumpeter 
in The Theory of Economic Development argued that invention was 
exogenous, and that economic growth occured when uncertainties 
were reduced sufficiently to induce a wave of innovation. 
9 
Later 
9. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development. 
in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy he focused on the speed 
of imitation and on the need fo;c monopoly profits to foster the 
commitment of resources to research and development. l
O 
While 
his later work has been the basis for intellectual exploitation by 
others,  his earlier work has not had the same impact. Kuznets 
was particularly concerned with the cost saving attributes of inno­
vation, and he argued that it was the first major invention in any 
1 1  industry that triggered the greatest rise in productivity. His 
primary interest was not with problems aris ing from the economic 
environment but with the sources of inventive activity. 
12 
While 
not explicitly discuss ing the productivity of various institutional 
structures, he was less concerned with appropriability, and less 
worried about uncertainty than was Schumpeter .  It is worth noting 
that his concern was almost entirely with process rather than 
product innovation. Both Kuznets and Schumpeter were interested 
in explaining the process of economic growth, but Kuznets'  focus
on process innovation may explain his relative lack of interest in 
the s cientific basis of technical development. Schumpeter ' s  
preoccupation with new products, however, tended to focus his 
attention on the need for formalized research. The different 
1 0 .  Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 
(Harper & Row, 3rd Edition, 1950) .  
6 
1 1. Simon Kuznets, Secular Movements in Production and Pri.ces, 
(1930). 
12. Kuznets argues that later inventions were less important
and tended to follow from the profits engendered by the imbalances 
produced by earlier innovations. This conclusion appears to rest in 
part on his relatively narrow definition of an industry and in part on 
certain a s s umptions about the elasticity of demand, Kuznets, 
Secular Movements. 
weights they assign to product and process development can probably 
be best explained i.n terms of their areas of experience. Kuznets, 
drawing on a wide ranging historical background, recognized that 
most developments were in fact process innovations. Schumpeter, 
impressed by those few developments that had a massive impact on 
the economy, turned his attention to new product breakthroughs. 
Both points should be kept in mind if one is interested in innovating 
structures that are conducive to technical change. As causes of 
innovations, � entrepreneurial rewards are important to both 
autho rs,  but reductions of uncertainties are more important to 
Schumpeter and likely to questions of product innovation in general. 
Since rewards from new product innovation tend to be less  certain 
and longer delayed, Schumpeter 1 s  policies are designed to provide 
temporal protection for those rewards. 
7 
In the past decade, Jacob Schmookler and W. Paul Strassman 
have examined the historical work underlying the views of Kuznets and 
Schumpeter in more detail. Schmookle r 1 s  interest is in questions o! 
economic g rowth, and therefore in both product as well as process inno-
. 13 th . . . f h" d h vat1on. For e emp1r1cal portion o is stu y e uses patents as a 
surrogate for technical change. 14 His conclusions support Kuznets 
to some extent. They indicate that inventors tend to invent that which 
is profitable, and that inventions do not appear to flow dire ctly from 
developments in pure science. On the other hand, his work implies 
that the type of invention {as opposed to its purpose) is dependent on 
the state of science and technology. Thus the greater complexity 
of modern inventions probably reflects the 11better quality" of science. 
1 3. JacdJSclrnookler, Invention and Economic G rowth, (Cambridge, 
Mas s . :  Harvard University Press,  1966). 
14. The patent statistics cover both process and product inventions; 
however, the 11patentability11 criterion biases the series toward product 
innovations. As a result, a railroad with the wheels ori the ground and -the 
rails on the car was granted a patent, but the Ford-Sorenson a s sembly 
line was not patentable. 
Strassrnan attempts to test Schumpeter1s conclusions concerning the 
IS importance of uncertainty reductions in fostering innovations. He 
concludes that the risks run by inventor-innov_ators in the nineteenth 
century were less than Schumpeter believed. In thi.s regard he also 
supports Kuznets1 position, but again the support may be the product 
of the bias toward proce s s  inve ntions in the history of any technology. 
Taking the four works together, one can conclude that anticipated 
profits are important in the production of new technologies.  For 
process changes, however, there is little evidence to support the 
contention that these profits must be protected from competitor s .  
N o  o n e  has shown that uncertainties are not a major barrier for
8 
product innovation, nor that the quality of inventions may be a function 
of �he stock of sci•ence and of applied engineering techniques. As to 
whether, as Schumpeter feels, the rates of accumulation of these stocks 
can be increased by policies ain1ed at protecting the profits of 
inventors is less clear. 
Schmookler 's work is just one example of a spate of literature 
that uses patents as a proxy for technical change. 16 The criticisms 
of the patent data are well known and need not be touched on at any 
length here. Utilization of patents as a measure of technical change 
not only involves very strong a s sumptions about the inter-patent dis-­
tribution of productivities and the industrial distrib'-1:tion -of the inven­
tions but also about the movement over ti.me in the costs and revenues
derived from the act  of patenting. Despite the weakne s s e s  inherent 
in that choice, patents are used because other measures are not 
easily available. Our survey however indicates that at least two authors have 
15. Stras sma.n, Risk and Technological Innovation.
16. Jacob Schmookler, "The Level of Inventive Activity,"
.Review of Economics and Statistics 36 (May 1954), pp. 18 3-190. 
9 
.suggested alternative measures, both based upon engineering data. 
Enos, in a study of the petroleum industry, utilized physical measures 
of productivity. 1
7 
In comparing six process innovations he measures
progress by the fall in the number of units of input required per unit 
of output. Since the innovations in question appear to have saved on 
all inputs he is not even faced with the problems of weighting the inputs. 
These r esults indicate that a micro focus, when possible, provides 
a superior measure of technical change. Ames 1 study of Bell Labs 
tends to support the same conclusions, even though he finds his data 
will not support direct measures of productivity change. 
1 8  Working 
from engineering specifications and c atalog des criptions, Ames i s  
able to distinguish between major a n d  minor developments, t o  follow 
the proce s s  of technical diffusions, and to compute life expectencies 
of particular technical developments. The role of engineering surrogates 
for technical progress i s ,  of course, limited to process changes where 
comparisons of productivity have some meaning. It is difficult if not 
impossible to conceive of how engineering data might be used to 
measure the contributions of new product innovation to technical prog r e s s .  
Perhaps when some empirical counterpart of the concept o f  consumer 
surplus is developed the way will be opened, but there is no indication 
that this is likely to occur in the near future. 
Despite these alternatives ,  patent data have provided the basis 
for a substantial proportion of the work done in economic history. 
The problems inherent in this approach are at least severe. Consider, 
for example, the alternative implications drawn fro1n the observation 
that the number of patents issued has declined since the early 1940s. 
To some it has been interpreted as a decline in national creativity; 
to another group merely a reflection of the institutionalization of 
res earch ( a reduction it1 the profits accruing to patentitlg intermediate 
steps); 1 9  and to others,  an indication only that technology itself is changing. 
17. John L. Enos, Petroleum Progress and Profits : A History 
of Process Innovation (Cambridge, Mas s . : M. I. T. Press, 1 9 62) .  
1 8 .  Edward Ames, "Obse rving the Effects of Research on 
Busines s , "  Purdue Faculty Papers in E conornic History 1 9 5 6 - 1 9 66, 
(lllinios: Richard D. Irwin, 1 9 67. ) 
19.  Schmookler, "The Level of Inventive Activity, " p. 185.
JO 
(A single patent is no\v sought to cover increasingly complex develop­
ments where in years passed a number of simpler developments would 
have each been covered by a single patent. )
20 
Ii patents are to be used
as the major data source, and if there is any expectation that the re sults 
of such utilization are to be useable, it appears neces sary to go below 
the aggregate numbe r s  and discover something about differential pro­
ductivities and life expectancies .. 
Comanor 1 s  study of the pharmaceutical industry, for example, 
suggests that the useful life of a patented invention is very short ( not 
much over two years). 2 1  The Bell inventions, on the other hand, live 
for much longer periods, and more complicated developments once 
22 innovated, tend to survive longe:r than simpler ones. It seems likely 
that the contrasting experiences can be traced to diffe rences in the 
industrial structure of the industries involved, but regardless of the 
cause such discrepancies cast se rious doubt on the use of raw patent 
series. 
Ames 1 work is important not only because it i s  rooted in 
engineering data a nd therefore provides some clues about the cost savings 
potential of particular technical developments, but also because it 
provides information on the econohlic life of tho se developments. The 
substitution of a catalog of offe red technologies for a list of patents i s  
productive i n  measuring inventive-innovative activity, although it i s  
appropriate t o  only a small subs.et of potential studie s .  Since the 
profits attached to any innovation are a function not only of the size 
20. Ame s, "Effects of Research on Business, 1 1  p. 402.
21. William S. Comanor, "Resea rch and Con1petitive
Product Differentiation in the Pharmeceutical Industry in the United 
States, '1 Economica 3 1  ( November 1 9 64) pp. 372-384. 
2 2 .  Ames, 1 1Effects o f  Research o n  Business. ' 1  
of potential earnings but also the tin1e di stribution of those earnings, 
patent data must be a.djusted to reflect both returns and that distri­
bution. This constraint i s  particularly binding if the concern is with 
the design of institutional s tructures. If the patent series are
adjusted for productivity and life expectancy it would be possible 
to discuss such topics as the optimal life of a patent or to compare 
l l  
the efficiencies of policies designed to increase appropriability with 
those designed to speed diffusion in a systematic fashion. Si.milarly, 
such adjustments might make it pas sible to explore the relationships 
between technical change and such exogenous institutional developments 
as industrial structure or the state of the capital markets. 
Two observations seem appropriate. Given the difficulty 
of making the suggested adjustments in the patent data, for proce s s  
innovations a t  least, i t  may be easier to g o  immediately t o  a more 
direct measure of technology by generating at the firm level measures 
similar to those produced either by Enos or Ames. 
23 If patents are 
to be used, some adjustments must be made. At the most general 
level the patents conld be more carefully read and finer class ifications 
·1 
. 24 produced even l no attempt ts made to research the underlying data. 
In addition, a project designed to sample the patent universe and then 
to examine the engineering and economic foundation for each patent 
in the sample appears to be both feasible and of substantial value. 
III. Technological Change and the Economic Historians
It is pos sible to turn to history for evidence to help answer 
questions that have interested students of technical changes. These 
23. Business history includes an extensive amount of
data as yet virtually unmined as a source of technical measurement, 
which could be utilized by future re searchers for studies in the 
manner of Enos and Ames. 
24. Cyril Grant, "Sources of Regional Technological Change
as Indicated by Patent Granted Statistics, 1 1  PhD Dissertation, 1967 
( Purdue University). See also, J. Schmookler and 0, H. Brownlee, 
"Determinants of Inventive .AC"tivity," American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings 52 #2 (May 1962), pp. 165-176. 
questions include first appropri.ability. The greater the degree of 
appropriability permitted by an institutional structure, the greater 
are the proportion of the profits that accrue to the inventor/innovator; 
however, this conClusion does not lead to any firm policy recommen­
dations. We know very little about the elasticity of technical chang.e 
with respect to profits, nor about the relative importance of invention 
versus diffusion in the determination of the rate of economic growth. 
We would like, for example, to compare the returns earned by 
institutional structures that increase appropriability with thos e  
produced by structures that socialize the research function and make 
the output available at a subsidized price to potential innovators. 
Second is the optimal size of the inventing/innovating 
unit. Again the economic histo1·y literature provide s  no certain 
answers but some evidence, In the literature we find evidence of 
increasing returns to scale flowing from (1) learning by doing, 25
(2) the importance of team research, 26 and ( 3) the reduction of
uncertainties arising in the production and marketing experience 
of integrated firms even when that experience is not directly relevant 
12 
h h . . 27 ' h . h . . d  to t e r esearc in question. .-i.t t e same hme t ere is some ev1 ence 
that decreasing returns may exist s ince creativity may be inversely 
correlated with firm size, and sunk market cost may reduce the 
potential profits from competitive technologies. 
25. Kenneth Arrow, ' 1 The Economic Implications of Learning by 
Doing, " Review of Economic Studies 29 ( June 1962) pp. 155-73. See also
Paul David, 1 1Learning by Doing and Tariff Protection: A Reconsideration 
of the Case of the Ante-Bellum United States Cotton Textile Industry, 1' 
Journal of Economic History 30# 3 {September 1970), pp. 55 1-601. 
26. Guy Hartcup, The Chailenge of War: Britain1 s Scientific and 
Engineering Contributions to World War II, {New York: Taplinger 
Publishing, 1970). 
27. Strassman, Risk and Technological Innovation. 
Third is the difference between product and process 
innovation. E conomic historians frequently assign product innovation 
a major role in their studies of economic growth; however, most of 
the technological history is written about process innovation. Since 
product innovation may involve marketing uncertainties not present 
in process development, there is no reason to believe that all 
ins.titutions will prove equally efficient in promoting both. Industry 
studies and work done on scientific effort on wartime provide some 
information on this subject, even when the technological literature 
does not. 
The following section provides a thumbnail review of the 
economic history literature of certain periods, industries, and 
sectors. There is no attempt to provide symmetry or c omplete
coverage. Although they constitute only a small part of total 
historical experience, the survey of the economic history literature 
indicated that the selected areas had been the subj ect of historical 
investigation and appeared to yield some interesting insights into the 
question of the relationship between institutional change and technical 
progress. 
1. The Industrial Revolution : No set of subjects, let
alone a single subject of a technological nature, has occupied 
economic historians more than the study of the century of British 
history that spanned the years 1 725 to 1 825. Despite the effort, 
1 3
that research tells us relatively little about the process of technical 
change, although it makes it clear that there was a great deal of change. 
The literature suggests that the economic environment was highly 
competitive, and appropriation of the gains from inventions difficult. 
Patent laws existed, but were seldom a barrier to the diffusion of 
technology. Information costs must have been low and the patent laws 
more observed in the breech. The breakdown of feudal monopolies 
and the movement towards free.r trade were characteristics of the 
economic environment; an envi.ronrnent that was particularly con­
ducive to rapid innovation. 28 The history of technical change within 
this environn'lent adds confirmation to the belief that expected profits 
rooted in innovation and application of that innovation to new markets, 
even if no barriers prohibit competitors from seeking those same 
profits, are sufficient to encourage rapid innovation. 
While one might think that an economic revolution would 
14 
involve the introduction of a wave of new products, the technological 
developments that have received the inost study were almost all proce s s  
innovations. Both Kuznets and Mantoux have observed that productivity 
gains were concentrated in textiles, iron making, and pottery. 29 All 
had markets marked by a high degree of price elasticity, and the�: ante 
profits to be produced by cost saving innovations must have seemed 
high. It is pos sible that the steam engines and machine tools were 
examples of product innovations, but even that conclusion is not clear. 
The history of the machine tool industry is a history of gradual move­
ment from pure process ta product innovation, and the latter was 
effected only after the market for the new products was known to exist. 30 
In the case of the steam engine, its use as a stationary power source 
(the original basis for development) should properly be viewed as a 
process innovation in the energy industry, if the focus is on market 
28. R. M. Hartwell, "The Causes of the Industrial Revolution: 
An Essay on Methodology, '1 Economic :History Review 18 #1 (1965). 
29. Paul Mantoux, The Industrial Revolution in the 18th
Century (London, 1 9 2 8 ) .  See also, Kuznets, Secular I\.1oveme nts. 
30. Nathan Rosenberg \ed. ), Great Britain and the .l\rnerican
System of Manufacturing (Edinburgh University Press, 1968). 
uncertainty. The later application to transport may be best viewed 
as product innovation, but it also can be argued that it was not:hing 
15 
but proce ss innovation in transportation. Under any conditions, research 
expenditures were small since most of the work had been done in the 
development of the stationary engine, The period was characterized 
by changes in the institutional structure that p robably increased the 
rate of capital accumulation and certainly made capital mobilization 
much less expensive. Since most of the technical progress was 
embodied in the capital stock, it is difficult to sort out the effects 
of accumulation-mobilization and technical change. This difficulty 
may explain the failure of economic historians, despite their 
preoccupation with the period, to provide an adequate scenario of 
the a'ctual proce s s  of invention and diffusion. 
As Kuznets has suggested, the inventions of the industrial 
reyolution were based on experience, and science played almost no 
role. Thus the period contributes little to an understanding of the 
relationship of institutions to science based change. Perhaps the 
competitive ins titutional s tructure so productive in that period i s
l e s s  useful when basic r e s earch and i t s  accompanying externalities 
are important." The hi.story of both the textile and the iron industry 
suggests that inventions were closely linked to perceived profits and 
that lack of appropriabi.lity was not a significant barrier to new 
developments. In this regard the industrial revolution appears to 
foreshadow Schmookler' s conclusions about a much later period.
For process innovation at least the prospects of profits (even when 
imitation is swift) arising from assured markets appears sufficient 
to under,,,, rite a high rate of technical prog r e s s .  The period did not, 
howeve r, produce substantial product innovation, a result that might 
be taken as negative evidence on the productivity of the totally free 
institutional structure in that dimension. It may, on the other hand, 
merely reflect the differing productivity of p roce ss versus product 
innovation in the eighteenth century. 
2. The U�A 1860 to 1 9 1 0 :  Jewkes has termed this the 
1 6  
"Heroic Age of Invention i n  the United States, ' 1  but he may have 
confused productivity changes with inventivenes s .  3 1  The economic 
history literature indicates that it was certainly a period of marked 
economic change, rapid income growth, and substantial innovations .  
32 
However, while there were some important American inventions, 
growth was largely postulated on the importation of foreign technologie s .  3
3 
Kelly discovered a blast steel proce ss and that proces s  was used in the 
D.atio n 1 s  first steel mill; but the bulk of the American steel industry was 
based on the importation of the Bessemer Technology. 
34 Agriculture was 
revolutionized by the opening ofthi::� wheat belt in the upper plains, but the crucial 
postbellurn technica.l development35 was the introduction of Hungarian reduction 
Triilling. 
36
rt was the g rowth in the railroad network that made a national market 
possible;
37
however ,  while there were American technical contributions ,  
growth was largely based _on proce s s  innovations on an already existing 
3 1 .  J. Jewkes ,  D. Sawe r s  and R. Stillerman, The Sources of 
Invention (London: Macmillan & Co. , Ltd. , 1 9 5 8 ) .  
3 2 .  Victor S .  Clarke, History of Manufacturers in the Uniti�d 
�. Vol. I & 2 ( Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1 929).  
3 3 .  There is a substantial body of literature about British a.nd 
American technology in the nineteenth century, but the focus has not been on 
technical change. Instead the argument has revolved around the differences 
in the two technologies, as reflections of the response to different factor prices. 
The discussion is of some interest from the point of view of diffusion of 
technology, but there is little that is relevant to an understanding of 
institutional structure s .  
34. Duncan Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking 
1867 - 1 9 39, (Cambridge, Mas s . : Cambridge Unive rs ity Pre s s ,  1 9 6 1 ) .  
35 .  The mechanical rea.per, first patented by Obed Hussey
in 1 8 33 and later improved substantially by Cyrus McCormick, was 
being marketed extensively prior to the Civil War. 
36. John Storck and William Dorwin Teague, Flour for Man_ 1 s  
Bread (Minneapolis; Unive r s ity of Minnesota Press,  1 952) p.  1 9 6 .  
37. Albert Fishlow, 1 1Productivity and Technological Change in 
the Railroad Sector, 1 840- 1 9 10, '' in Output, Employment and Productivity 
in the United State s after 1 800,  Studies in Income and \l{ealth, Vol. 30 
(New York: NEER, 1966). 
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and well proved technology. 38 Still there were some major American
inventions and they do pro:Vide us with some clues as to the relationship 
between institutional structure and technical progress. 
The conventional wisdom, both economic and historical, 
suggests that the rate of technical progr e s s  was in part dependent upon 
the degree of uncertainty that faced nineteenth century innovators. 
Stra s s man1s study of manufacturing methods in the period reveals that 
technological innovation was relatively free from high-risk factors .  39 
He argues that interference risks from labor were negligible since 
workers were neither threatened to any great extent by labor- saving 
inventions 
40 
nor sufficiently organized to pose a threat themselves .  
The government at all levels was generally sympathetic to the interests 
of the busine s s  s ector and passed tax and tariff laws which served to 
stimulate innovation. Consumers were on the whole open to new methods 
and products, reducing marketing uncertainties. Furthermore, 
production risks especially those involving chemical proce s s e s  became
le s s  insuperable as scientists and scientifically trained en'gineers 
became more and more involved in the proce s s  of innovation. 
The developments that concern Jewkes were in electricity 
(Edison and Brush), petroleum, and communications (the telephone). 
Of the group the telephone is clearly a new product, a case can be 
made that certain parts of the electric industry (lighting) should be 
put i n  the same category, but, while kerosene i s  a new product it 
almost certainly ought to be considered a proce s s  innnovation in 
illumination. Still in the period there was a grouping of new product 
innovation about which we do have some historical evidence. Perhaps 
38. The Westinghouse air brake, the automatic coupler and
the consolidation type steam engine were important technical breakthroughs 
in the railroad industry. All of the above, however, were antedated by 
similar patented devices. See Schmookler, Inventionand E conomic 
Growth , pp. 269-274. 
39 .  Strassman, Risk and Technological Innovation. 
40. Strassman i s  not quite correct in terms of the threat to labor. 
There are certainly examples of skilled craftsmen whose position was undercut 
by technical advance. The cordwainers, cigar makers and gla s s  blowers (to 
tite only three) certainly fall into this class. Their total numbers , however, 
may have been small, and certainly they were not strong enough to prevent 
the innovation of new technology. 
equally important there appears for the first time to be some 
connection between inventions and scientific development. 
41 
Edison was a great inventor, but he knew very little about 
science in general or electri city in particular. Most of his electrical 
inventions were based on reasoning by analogy from natural gas to 
42 
electricity. A cursory examination of his contributions appears 
to add weight to Kuznets 1 argument about the relation of invention 
to science. A more careful reading suggests that conclusion is 
probably erroneous. Edison1s lack of scientific training put him 
on the wrong side of the AC-DC controversy and ultimately cost 
him his position at General Electric. Moreover, even Edison 
recognized that at times science was important, and he built an 
organization that would permit him to draw on the abilities of people 
with scientific training. His laboratory at Menlo Park was an 
example of one of the first attempts to institutionalize the res earch 
function. 
Bell had a much better understanding of the role of 
science, and his recognition of the importance of that field can 
be seen in his support of the pure science done at the Volta 
Laboratories. 
43 
He also, however, explicitly recognized the 
appropriability problem, and viewed his support of pure s cience not 
as a profit making venture but as largely an exercise in philanthropy. 
Even so, the degree of appropriability must have been much greater 
for natural monopolies like the telephone industry than it was for 
Edison under constant competitive pressure from Westinghouse 
41. Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth. 
42. Harold C. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers 
1875- 1900 ( Cambridge, Mas s . : Harvard Univers ity Pre s s ,  1 9 5 3 ) .  
43. Jewkes, e t  al, The Sources of Invention, p .  56.
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and a handful of other firms. Bell was not the only science trained 
inventor of importance in the period. Both Brush and Elihu 
44 
Thomson came to Technology with some scientific background. 
19 
Times had begun to change, and these, perhaps,  were the changes 
Schumpeter saw. The changes also had a n  institutional counterpart 
with the emergence of technical s chools (Coopers Union, for example) 
and scientific institutes (The Franklin Institute). However the 
precise contribution of early formal scientific education to the 
pro c e s s  of technical development has not been the subject of sub­
stantial historical inquiry. 
Finally, the petroleum industry provides examples of 
research based on s cience, but also example s of the older purely 
empirical developments. The close temporal connection between 
Sil�iman1 s 1855 scientific paper and the invention of fractional 
distillation must be one of the earliest examples of a development 
in science leading directly to technical change. 
45 Conversely, it
appears that the development of destructive cracking was a purely 
unini:entional byproduct of refiners 1  attempts to squeeze more and 
f . . k 4 6  " d  more output ram a given capital stoc , and provi e s  one more 
piece of evidence for those who believe that 0learning by doing" 
f . . f . . 
47 
accounts or a maJOr portion o p r oc e ss innovation. 
44. Jewkes, et al, The Sources of Invention, p. 57. See also,
Passer, The Electrical ?i.ian ufac t ur e r s  187S-1900. 
45.  Harold F. Williamson and Arnold R .  Daum, The American 
Petroleum Industry, Vol. I, The Age of Illum inat i on {Evanston, lllinios:
Northwestern University Press, 1959.} 
46. Harold F. Williamson, R alp h L. Andreana, Arnold Daum
and G ilbert Close, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of 
Energy 1899 - 1 956 (Evanston, Illinois :  Northwestern University Press,  1 9 63).  
47.  Schmookler, Inventions and E conomic Growt�. 
What then can we deduce about institutional development 
from the technological hi story of this period? There was a con­
stellation of product developments and the s e  may have been related 
to a number of changes in the institutional structure t hat appe ar to 
have reduced market uncertainties. For example, the period saw the 
emergence of a truly national market for both inputs and final 
products. This development not only increased the total profit 
potential of an innovation, but also reduced uncertainties about 
prices and tastes in regions far removed from the innovators1 
immediate ken. At the same time, both the electric generation 
and the telephone system were natural monopolies, so t he p e r iod 
may provide some evidence in support of the Schumpeterian con­
clusion. Again, the emergence of a science based technology 
appears to have engendered some economies of s cale in research. 
Even Edison admitted that a little mathematics was an efficient 
substitute for complicated mechanical models. T he result was 
the innovation of a new institutional form -- the research laborato.t:y. 
In the period the legal structure m ade p ate n t s  increasin gly enfor­
ceable, although the courts tended to hold that an un used p atent 
zo 
48 p· 11 . . . h . d ·11was no patent at all. 1na y, innovation in t e U n ite States w as sh 
largely concentrated in process changes where m ark e t  unc e r t ain ti_e s 
were negligible and in industries that were n atural mon op ol ie s. 
A s  a result, there i s  little evidence that a n  institutional st ructure 
that did not prohibit rapid im it ation inh ibi te d deve lopment in the 
way Schumpeter believed. Such a st r ucture d oe s  n ot appe ar to 
dis courage proces s  developments b ased on l e arning by doing, since 
the techn ological developments were to a l ar ge e xtent embod ied and 
48. Strassman, Risk and Technological Innovation, p. 192.
s o  in part at least appropriable. E qually important, since they 
Were produced in the normal course of busine s s ,  their marginal 
development costs were probably close to zero. 
3. World War II: Although the e".ta of the second world 
war has drawn le s s  attention from economic historians than the 
two earlier periods, it was a period of rapid technological 
21 
progre s s .  B y  all accounts V..'orld War II produced a wave o f  product 
innovation, but the history also suggests that the rate of new product 
development was not high until market uncertainties were reduced. 
Radar, considered a miracle by many, languished for ten years 
until the government made the decision to innovate that form of 
aircraft defense. The basic research on penicillin had been com­
pleted by the early 1 9 30s,  but production difficulties made inno­
vali.on appear unprofitable until the approach of war greatly increa�ed 
the potential demand for a broad spectrum antibiotic. A similar lag 
with less positive results from the point of view of product innovation 
can be seen in the case of German jet aircraft development; In the 
case of both radar and jet aircraft development, the government 
was the dominant potential demander. Often development appears to 
await the recognition of profitable employment for the product, and 
history suggests that when there is little competition for that product, 
that wait may be very long indeed. The wartime experience also 
brings to light another problem that has not been so well investigated. 
Vlhile the decision to 11go ahead1 1  with some technical development 
frequently produced rapid technical advance by concentrating all attention 
on a single line of development, it also tended to reduce diversity and may, 
in the long run have resulted in slower development. Britain's experience 
with the jet engine is a case in point. The government's decision to reduce 
the role of Jet Power Company and turn a substantial amount of development 
work over to Rover froze technology and contributed to the failure of 
48a Britain to get an operational aircraft by the war's end. 
48a. Jewke s, et al, The Sources of Invention, pp. 3 1 4- 3 17. 
An examination of history also contributes to our under­
standing of the productivity of a variety of research organizations. 
The literature frequently stre sses the importance of the 11research 
team. 1 149 It is argued that continuing existence apparently generates 
externalities not only through 1 11.earning by doing11 but also through the 
development of interpersonal relationships that make the group more 
productive than the sum of the individuals. In addition, a comparison 
of British-American res earch efforts with those in G ermany suggests 
that in�titutions that produced feedback between research and develop­
ment personnel, units devoted to production, and those groups charged 
with utilizing the product were much more productive than those 
structures without analagous mE�chanisms. The Americans and 
British had scientific personnel involved in all of the 1 1follow-through" 
operations but the Germans tended not to follow that practice. The 
allie s were much quicker to a s s e s s  production bottlenecks and market 
failures an.d suggest modifications than was the Axis power. 
Not all wartime research and development was succes sful, 
and history suggests that the mere existence of guaranteed markets 
or a socialization of the research function does not guarantee that 
the res earch will be successful or if succes sful that the output will be 
productive. Once a market had been g uaranteed, the development of 
radar was swift, but similar guarantees even though supported by 
a substantial resource comrnitrnent did not produce a succes sful 
aerial mine. !\1oreover, there ·v;ere numerous examples of research 
22 
decisions that show that in the absence of a market test £or productivity, 
expenditures in research and development may result in inventions, 
that while technically feasible, have no " comn1ercial value. " Operation 
49. James Phinney Baxter, Scie ntists Against Time (Boston,
Mas s . : Little, Brown, 1946). See also Hartcup, The Challenge of 
the War. 
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Habbakkuk, the Pykecrete project, is a case in point. SO Technically it was 
feasible to produce an aln1ost unsinkable ship two miles long made of irozen 
water and sawdust, but how did its development shorten the war? These 
wartime re search experiences concerning the process of technical change 
suggests certain hypotheses: some organizational structures 
appear more productive than others, and the success of team research 
implies that there were econoni.ies of scale in R&D. A reduction of 
market uncertainty appears to increase the levels of new product 
invention-innovation and full subsidization of research almost cer-
tainly increases the output of that activity. Reduced uncertainty and 
subsidization are, however, not panaceas. Institutions with 
these characteristics can increase research output, but they do not 
guarantee solutions to any particular problems. Moreover, since 
resources are finite, such structures may lead to inferior choices 
wh�n decisions must be made between alternative lines of research 
and they may produce a technology that has little relevance to anything. 
Finally, the decision of the monopsonist in the market for technology 
{the government) to subsidize a particular development almost certainly 
tends to eliminate competing technologies and this reduction of diversity 
may in the long run retard development. 
4. Agriculture: Economic historians have not only been 
intrigued by certain periods in the past, but they have also written 
extensively about particular firms and industries. While the focus 
has seldom Leen technological change, they have been concerned 
with both organization and the response of the units to governmental 
policy. We have made no attempt to survey all of the literature in 
the fields of industrial and business history, but we have examined 
50. Hartcup, The Challenge of the War, pp. 258-262. 
several industries in some detail, and it appears that two are 
particularly relevant. 
Recent work in theory has suggested that optimum levels 
of expenditure in research and development decline as the number 
51 
of firms in the industry increase. Agriculture is a competitive 
industry, and its history provides some evidence on this question. 
It indicates that early attempts to organize research on a voluntary 
cooperative basis were never very successful;52the free rider 
problem was clearly apparent in the nineteenth century. Most of 
the productivity increases since the 1860s have come either fror:n 
socialized research activities or from private firms able to appro­
priate the gains of their research by selling products embodying 
these developments. The research experience of the Department of 
Agriculture is particularly interesting since it is one of the few 
American examples of government financed research not carried 
out under the pressure of war. The Department has been highly 
successful in producing process developments but less successful 
in increasing the rate of invention-innovation in new products. 
Over the past century and a quarter the Department evolved 
an institutional structure very similar to that which proved so pro­
ductive for military research during the Second World War. In Jact, 
the chroniclers of the war would almost certainly have been less 
generous with their praise of the British-American effort had they 
noticed that the structure tha.t finally evolved was very similar to 
structure that the Department had already developed. The early 
51. L. E. Ruff, '1Research and Technological Progress i.n 
a Cournot Economy," Journal of Economic Theory (Decernber 1969), 
PP• 397-415. 
52. Wayne Rasmussen, (ed. ) Readings in the Hist.cry oj 
American Agriculture (Urbana, Illinios: University of Illinios 
Press, 1960). 
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period of organizational experirnentation could p robably have been 
reduced had the government innovated the already proven structure. 
By the end of the ninetee nth century, the Department was 
organized with an ad1ninistrative group i n  Vlashington, ag'ricultural 
experin1ent stations located in the areas where the output of the 
r e s e a r c h  was likely to be used, and a group of subsidized agents 
5 3  
who could supervise innovation and report r e sults from the field. 
25 
In the twentieth c e ntury, the structure was modified to c e ntralized 
basi.c research in a single laboratory, but the responsibility for 
applied r e s e a r c h  and development still rested with: the experiment 
stations. Thus whatever economies of scale existed in team research 
w e r e  realized while the feedback mechanism was probably superior 
to tho s e  developed during the Second World War. Applied work was 
done close to the areas of use, and the agents not only provided a 
continual source of information on the actual productivity of new 
developments but also diss eminated new technical developments 
quickly and cheaply. Although the objective function of the Department 
has never been clearly articulated, the structure at least permits 
it to be exercised. It is less clear that the wa rtime structure had 
this capability. Finally, the output of basic r e s e a r c h  was rnade eas ily 
available not only to the experiment stations but to any private firms 
that wanted to pursue further research and development themselves. 
Such low information costs c e rtainly increased the rate of technological 
diffusion. :lvloreover, by opening up applied research to a nu1nber of
potential users, lt pe rn1its parallel research paths to be followed. It 
seems at least po s s ible that the diversity s o  engendered could prove 
more productive i.n the long run than the single channel development 
5 3 .  A .  Hunter Dup r e e ,  Science in the Federal Gove rnment
( C ambridge, Ma s s . : Belknap P r e s s ,  1957). See also Rasn1u s s e n ,  
History of An1erican Agriculture. 
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that was chara cteristic of s o  much wartime research. Basic research 
is centralized and it would be interesting to e s timate the scale gains from 
the team and cornp a r e  them with the diversity lo s s e s  from centralization. 
The Department has i n  part recognized this problem and continues to 
underwrite some basic research through university contracts. 
G r iliche s 1  work in hybrid corn measures both the productivity 
of the investment in r e s e arch and development and the speed at which 
this technical development was diffused through the economy. 
54 
For 
one crop, at least, it c a n  be used to provide a measure of the effective­
ne s s  of the Departme n t ' s  ins titutional structure. In that instance, a t  
least, rapid imitation did not stand i n  the way o f  development, and a 
substantial portion of the gains w e r e  accrued by the consumers rather 
than the business s e c t o r s .  
Although the Department of Agriculture has made major 
contributions in the a r e a  of p r o c e s s  innovation, the i r  performance 
i n  the area of product innovation has been l e s s  spectacular. In 
its early y e a r s ,  the Depa rt::nent did promote new products, but 
most were "exotic" and foredoon1ed to failure. 
55 
The commitments to 
silk and tea fall into this catego<y. The goal i.n most of these cases 
was American economic self- suffi cien cy, not increased productivity. 
It i s  interesting to note that these excursions antedated real far1ner 
inputs into the d e c i s i o n - making p r o c e s s  of the USDA. In the periods 
of the Department1s greatest activity, two major "new" products
have become important, peanuts and soybeans; however, the 
Department contributed little to their original development, 
54. Zvi G r iliche s ,  1'Hybrid C o r n :  An Exploration i n  the 
Econo1ni c s  of T e chnological Change , "  Econometrica (October 19 57). 
See also, Zvi G r iliches, " Re s e a r c h  C o s t  and Social Return - Hybrid 
C o r n  and Related Innovations , "  Journal of Political Economy 
(October I 9 5 8 ). 
55. Paul W. Gates, The Farn1e r 1 s  Age 1815 -1860 Vol. III 
The Economic History of the United States (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, 1960). 
nor have they added much to the R&D that was required to produce 
marketable products. A similar conclusion is reached from an 
examination of the Department1 s contribution to those technological 
developments embodied i.n the capital stock. The USDA has 
developed improved ploughs, cotton gins, spraying machines and 
a host of other devices that have increased p roductivity. In almost 
every case, howeve r, the innovations have been process improve-
ments on already existing equipment . The crop dusting apparatus 
patented in the early thirties is one of the few ex.imples of a new 
product innovation, 
As a comment on institutional structure, it is interesting 
27 
to note that in some dimensions at least, the feedback mechanism has 
proved almost counterproductive. In part this problem arises from 
the failure of society to articulate clearly the Department1 s research 
goals. The �partrnent i s  largely a political creature and, a s  such, 
re sponsive to its constituents. The feedback mechanisms so useful 
i n  reporting successes and failures are equally efficient in conveying 
the opinions of the farmers to the decision-making units in Washington. 
These constituents are interested in increasing the productivity 
of their agricultural capital not the total agricultural stock of society. 
This criteria may well account for the bias toward innovations geared 
to improving existing technology other than developing new products. 
The farmers have proved almost unconcerned with poss ible long-term 
developments (their rate of dis count n1ay v.ell be above society' s )  and 
in addition they appear to recognize that the profits from the new 
. 5 6  products might accrue to a different group o f  people. 
56. Charles Rosenberg1s work on scientists in the early
agricultural experiment stations has examined the problems of research 
geared to satisfying the relatively scientifically unsophisticated farmer. 
See 1 1Science, Technology and Economic Growth: The Case of Agri·:cultural 
Experiment Station Scientist, 1 875- 1 9 1 4, " Agricultural History Vol. 45, 
(January 1 97 1 ) . 
Despite the obvious importance of this institutional 
structure, we still know relatively little about the a ctivities of 
2 8  
the Department. Griliches1 productivity- studies could be duplicated 
for other products (p3-rticularly for new products, fertilizers and 
pesticides). It appears that research aimed at discovering the 
criteria behind the assignment of research priorities within the 
Department would be very valuable and the total institutional structure 
could be examined to determine if it is , in fact, as productive as 
it appears from a reading of its history. ( It is clear that in this area 
more than most of the history has been written by the propagandists 
of the institution itself. ) 
5 .  The Petroleum Industry in the Twentieth Century: The 
early history was touched on in our discussion of the ' 1 fleroic Age 
of American Invention, ' 1  the more recent history, illuminated by 
the work of the Hidys, E no s ,  and Andreana and Vlilliarnson, i s  pc.rticularly 
suggestive as to the research p roductivity of alternative institutional 
5 7  
structures. The period spans the years 1 9 1 0  t o  1940, and the 
change involves the development of the continuous catalytic c racking 
proce s s .  Before the 1 890s profits came from kerosene sales, but 
the widespread innovati'on of electricity and the discovery of oil 
in Russia had greatly reduced the industry1s traditional markets . 
With the movement to auto transportation, the indust r y 1 s  den1and 
again began to increase, ·but the technology was not well suited to 
the production of gasoline. 
In 19 1 3, the discovery of the Burton proc e s s  made Lt possible 
to crack heavy petroleum and produce gasoline at a substantial cost 
57. E no s ,  Petroleum Progress and Profits; Ralph W. Hidy 
and Muriel E .  Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882-1911: Historx.: 
of Standard Oi.l Company (New Jersey) , (New York: Ha rper & Brother s ,  
1955). See also Williamson, e t  al, The American Petroleum Industry. 
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saving s .  The mo nopoly rents demanded by Standard of I ndiana 
for licensing its pro c e s s  touched off an intensive search for 
alternative technologi e.s not covered by the original patent. S?a
The increased level and more h ighly fo cused research produced 
a series of inventions that were themselves improvem ents on the 
58 . . i· h Burton pro cess. As a r e sult, 1n a period of o nly s tg tly over
three decades the industry moved from thermal cracking, to 
continuo u s  thermal cracking, to catalytic cracking. In that 
process  the resource inputs per 100 gallons of gas fell from 396 
to 170 gallons of raw petroleum, $8, 600 to $320 of capital equipment, 
1 .  6 to . 02 man-hours of labor, and 8. 4 to 1. l million BTU1 s of 
59energy. 
The history of the industry suggests that, first, within 
the context of the American business environment, the decision 
to 7ngage in re search i s  a very delicate one. In every case, 
developments were the products of research groups nurtured and 
protected by a s i ngle individual in some position of authority. When 
57a. Williamson et al, The Amer ican Petroleum Indust:..::Y: 
58. To a certain extent thi s  argun1ent sounds like the one frequently
made in studies of economic development where latecomers arc a s sumed 
to have substantial advantages because they have no fixed capital. No 
such a s s er tion is made i n  this case. Instead the argument m erely infers 
that there ar e more than one possible solutions to the problem and there 
are gains from being fir st even if that fir st solution is not nec e s sarily 
th e best.  At a later tilne fu rther res earch may produce improved 
technical solutions, but there i s  more incentive f or firms for ced to pay 
high licensing fees than for firms who are deriving their income from 
tho s e  licenses to continue the search. Had the new developn1ent s been 
economically inferior, they would not have been adopted since monopoly 
rents would have fallen suific iently lo keep the Burton process competitive.
59. Enos, Petroleum Progress and Profits. 
that person moved or lost his  interest, the research group 
languished and prod1.1;ctivity ceased. Seco nd, although it must 
have been clear that the bulk of the technical capital was embodied 
30 
in the re search group and while thi s capital, though perhaps spe cialized 
to the industry, was certainly not specialized to any firm, there were 
few attempts to raid the s e  groups. Raiding was not an unfamiliar 
institutions technology since t he Tube and Tank process was discovered 
by a resear ch group at Jersey Standard that had been bid away from 
60 
Standard of Indiana. No other firm, however, attempted to duplicated 
that coup. The explanation of this behavior is not obvious. It may 
reflect som ething about the st.ructure of the industry (the evidence o f  
any cheating o n  a cartel decision vvould b e  e a s y  to discover) or about 
the substitutability of research groups. Third, in th ese examples at 
least, the attempts to r e search around a pro cess patent produced a 
series of superior technical solutions.  Fourth, the twentieth century 
inarket for research i s  characterized by the same types of failures 
that marked th� nineteenth ·century capital market; but, economic .� 
pressures have not produced a set of institutional innovations s in1ilar 
to tho s e  that underwrote the in:iprovement in  the market for funds. 
This last part raises more general questions. Why are there 
no institutions designed to arbitrage the market for research personnel? 
Is it  because knowledge is  too specialized or because there are over­
whelming economi e s  of scale in group research? If such economies 
exist, why are there so few companies specializing in research? 
There are, after all, no legal barr iers similar to the National Banking 
Act that prohibit the development of national research corporations. 
It is possible that knowledge i s  too spe cialized, or such arrangcmf�nts 
are subject to industrial espionage, or, perhaps, that there i.s little 
research on new produ cts and most of the capital for p rocess research 
i s  etnbodi.ed in the existing proc esses and their operators. Whatever 
the explanation, the question wa.rrants further study. Fourth, the rno st 
60. Enos, Petroleum Progre s s  and Profits. p. 231.
savings. The monopoly rents de1nanded by Standard of Indiana 
for licensing its proce s s  touched off an intensive search for 
alternative technologies not covered by the original patent. S?a
The increased level and more highly focused .research produced 
a series of inventions that 'W ere themselves improvements on the 
58 Burton proc e s s .  As a result, in a period of only slightly over 
three decades the industry moved from thermal cracking, to 
continuous thermal cracking, to catalytic cracking. In that 
process the resource inputs per 1 0 0  gallons of gas fell from 396 
to 170 gallons of raw petroleum, $8, 600 to $ 320 of capital equipment, 
1 .  6 to . 02 man-hours of labo r, and 8. 4 to l .  1 million BTU1 s of 
59 energy. 
The history of the industry suggests that, first, within 
the context of the American business environment, the decision 
to �ngage in research is a \'ery delicate one. In every case, 
developments were the products of research groups nurtured and 
protected by a single individual in some position of authority. When 
57a. Williamson et al, The American Pe� roleum Indus� 
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58. To a ce rtain extent this argun1ent sounds like the one frequently
made in studies of economic development where latecon1ers are as sumed 
to have substantial advantages because they have no fixed capital. No 
such a s s ertion is made in thi s  case, Instead the argument mer ely infers 
that there are more than one possible solutions to the problern and there 
are gains from being first even if that first solution is not necessarily 
the best. At a later time further research may produce improved 
technical solutions ,  but there is more incentive for firms forced to pay 
high licensing fees than for firms who are deriving their income irorn 
those licenses to continue the search. Had the new developn1ents been 
economically inferior, they would not have been adopted since monopoly 
rents would have fallen suificiently lo keep lhe Burtun [Jrocess competitive. 
59. Enos, Petroleum Progress and Profits.
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I.hat per son moved o r  Jost his interest, the research group 
languished and produ.ctivity ceased. Second, although it must 
have been clear that the bulk of the technical capital was embodied 
in the research group and v.-hile this capital, though perhaps specialized 
to the industry, wa s certainly not specialized to any firm, there were 
few attempts to raid the se groups. Raiding was not an unfamiliar 
institutions technology since the Tube and Tank process was d iscovered 
by a research group at Je rsey Standard that had been bid away fronl. 
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Standard of Indiana. No other firm, howeve r ,  attempted to duplicated 
that coup. The explanation of this behavior is not obvious. It may 
reflect something about the structure of the industry (the evidence of 
any cheating on a cartel decision would be easy to discover) or about 
the substitutability of research groups. Third, in these examples at 
least, the attempts to research around a proc e s s  patent produced a 
s e rie s  of superior technical solutions. Fourth, the twentieth century 
market for research is characterized by the same types of failures 
that marked th� nineteenth c�!ntury capital market; but, economic _, 
p r e s sures have not produced a set of institutional innovations similar 
to thos e  that underwrote the improvement in the market for funds. 
This last part raises more general questions. Why are there 
no institutions designed to arbitrage the market for research personnel? 
ls it because knowledge is too specialized or because there are ove r ­
whelming economies o f  scale i n  group research? If such econorr1ies
exist, why are there so few companies spec i.:ilizing in research? 
There are, after all, no legal barriers similar to the National Banking 
Act that prohibit the developrnent of national research corporations. 
It is possible that knov,:ledge i s  too specialized, or such arrangernents 
are subj e ct to industrial e spionage, or, perhaps, that there is little 
research on new products and most of the capital for process research 
i s  embodied in the existing proc e s s e s  and their ope rato rs.  Whatever 
the explanation, the question w a r rants further study. Fourth, the most 
60. Eno s ,  Petroleum Progress and Profits.  p. 2 3 1 .  
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radical departures w e r e  made by researchers operating on the 
periphery of the industry, but the laboratories of the large companies, 
while not proving creative have been very efficient i n  adapting and 
applying the inventions of othe r s .  This latter obse rvation tends to 
confirm the l e s s o n s  drawn from the experience of the Department 
of Agriculture, but it makes the absence of specialized research 
companie s even more difficult to explain. 
One explanation for such an absence may be that the unive rsity 
a s  a center for federal and industrial sponsored research i s  too 
strong a competitor. A profit-oriented research company would 
have to shoulder the total cost, at least initially, for personnel 
and equipment - - a cost which for most university re search i s  
shared jointly b y  the university and sponsoring agency. Profe s sional 
soc�eties and journals provide information and feedback mechanisms. 
The cost of this structure is relatively low compared to that which 
would have to be invested by a research company i.f it were to achieve 
similar ends. In addition, there is an appropriability problem. Since 
most unive rsities are not profit- o r i e nted, they have not aggress ively 
pursued the profits inhe rent in much of their research activiti e s .  
Instead they have allowed researchers t o  move their succes sful 
experiments 11off campu s 1 1  and capture a substantive portion of the 
profits. If it is the case that unive rsities are in part respons ible for 
the absence of specialized research firms, perhaps future work in 
this area should examine more closely the moveinent of on- campus 
research into the profit- making sector. 
IV. CONCL UDING OBSERVATIONS 
1 .  On Appropriability: While there may have been some 
improvements in the rno re recent past, it has been difficult to 
appropriate the profits of a p r o c e s s  innovation, Often the change 
comes from the stock of skills acquired through learning by doing, 
and other firms in the industry tend to have similar inventories of 
skills. Nor have patents worked well to protect the profits of the 
process inventor, whether he was Eli Whitney or the steel innovato r s  
61 Cort, Heath and Mushet. In the mo r e  recent past, patents have 
provided better protection, but the gains have not been substantial. 
In the case of the petroleum industry, an example of a development 
into a nnew11 area, the skills of C•ther research teams underwrote 
successful counter innovation in a relatively short time. The Burton 
proce s s  innovated in 1913 had one hundred percent of the market 
until 1919, but by 1928 was the technology of choice for the producers . 
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of only ten percent of gasoline output. A s imilar story is found in 
the recent history o f  the computer software industry. 
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A team can 
produce a new software system { a  p r o c e s s  innovation), but despite 
the copyright laws, the e c o nomic life of the innovation is relatively 
short and appears to be becoming shorter as the requisite skills 
become more widely dispersed. In other indu stries, where an entire 
technology is not in question, the period of succes sful appropriability 
has been even l e s s .  The brief effective lifetime of these legally 
protected monopolies probably explains why industrial secrecy has 
become so important. 
61. Who a r e  known in the li.te rature as the metallu rgical 
martyrs. Alan Birch, The Economic History of British Iron and 
Steel Industry, 1784-1879 (London: Frank C a s s ,  1967), p. 317. 
62. E no s ,, Petroleum P r o o r e s s  and Profits. 
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63. Electric Compute r s :  Gaps in ·�·echnology, presented a!: the 
Third Ministerial Meeting o n  Science of OECD Countries (March 11 &: 12, 1968)
In the case of product innovation, institutional instruments 
designed to permit appropriability appear to have worked only 
slightly more effectively. In the case of pharmaceuticals, Comanor 1 s  
work implies that even with patents duplication time i s  extremely 
short but that in the absence of patents it is unlikely that a firm 
could expect monopoly p rofits for any period of time. 64 Even with 
patents' protection, counter research appeared to produce substitute 
products within two or three years. While this example is likely 
extreme, the history of other industries seems to suggest that the 
difference i s  of degree, not kind. 
The history of both product and process innovation suggests 
that a significant part of the research potential is embodied in the 
research e stablishment. Even with patents and copyrights the extent 
of appropri.abili.ty rests in large part on the speed with which results 
can be duplicated. Speed depends in part upon the s ubstitutability 
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o f  research groups o r  the possibility of acquiring the skills o f  the 
superior group. The ability of existing firms to produce substitute 
technology has been demonstrated in a numbe r of cases,  and it may 
account for the failure of research firms to emerge. For such firms, 
a sales talk may well provide s ufficient clues to an alert research 
team to permit duplication without any further collabo r -
cation. In an industry where the ability to copy and adopt is still 
lacking, research teams do have a positive price. The takeovers of 
software firms can be viewed merely as purchases of research 
capability. Increases in the degree to which research skills are 
transferable may also account for the recent de'cline in patenting 
activity and the increased emphasis on industrial secrecy and espionage. 
64. Comanor, 11Product Differentiation in the Pharmeceutical 
Industry. 1 1 
From the point of view of the design of optin1al R&D 
structures, this study suggests that future research should focus 
in part on '1learning '!Jy doing" and the externalities inherent in 
team research with particular emphasis on interindustry differences 
in the ability to produce s ubsf:itute technologies . In this last regard, 
it appears impossible to ignore the effects of the industry1 s or­
ganization. It should surprise no one that Bell Laboratories are 
supported by an almost totally monopolized industry but historians 
have written relatively little about the research efforts of more 
oligopolistic industries. 
2. On Retur'ns to Scale: Historically returns to scale
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were important in process innovation, In the machine tool industry, 
for example, there was a tendency for the firms to innovate an institu­
tional structure that made process innovation easy. Over time, 
however, these structures often produced new products as well. 
In process innovation learning by doing and the feedback mecha-
nisms that have proven themselves so efficient elsewhere 
were an almost natural part of the institutional structure 
provided by the producing unit. Within the saine firm are the 
inventors and the engineers who oversee the use of the innovation 
(in many cases these are the same groups of people) and even 
salesmen who are in contact with the users of the final product, 
Internally the firms naturally rep roduce the structure that had to 
be innovated at some cost in both the wartime laboratories and the 
Department of Agriculture. .Moreover, since the feedback functions 
are natural byproducts of the day to day activities of the integrated 
firm, their marginal costs are almost certainly le s s  than they would 
be to any firm that cannot con1bine such functions. It has been 
argued that there are not necessarily economies of scale in 1 1learning 
by doing" since vertical disintegration should allow small firms 
each specializing in some small phase of the operation to develop 
the same learning skills as could be done in a large integrated firm. 
In the case of product innovation, this allegation may be true. In 
the case of process innovation, however, it  was not always true. 
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For proce s s  developrr..ent, to the extent the learned skills sometimes 
involved in-house tasks, such gains may have been captured in smaller 
specialized firms. Often, however, the innovations involved the 
movement of products through the production process and for a 
specialized firm these activities may occur outside the producing 
unit. In these cas e s ,  for specialized firms there would be no doing 
and therefore no learning. (Perhaps in this case the activity would 
be better called learning by watching . ) Whateve r it is called, however, 
it should be no surprise that highly sPecialized firms in the British
textile industry produced few a s sembly innovations while such develop­
me?t s  were very common in the larger and less specialized American 
firms. Similarly, it was the American not the British auto industry 
that produced the a s sembly line. 
The machine tool industry provides an interesting example 
of both feedback and learning by doing processes and, thus, provides 
some evidence on the ques tion of optimal institutional structure. In 
the early nineteenth century there were no machine tool companie s ,  
but there were groups o f  ' 1engineers11  i n  textile companies who were 
charged with the repair and modification of the existing capital 
stock. Building on their experience in maintenance and repair, 
these men began to produce new a s  opposed to modified n1achines .  
The new machines a t  first merely replaced already existing ones in 
the traditional process and therefore the economies engendered 
from easy feedback and learning by doing accrued within the existing 
institutional structure. From time to ti1ne, however, the se early 
"research teamsn produced machines that w e re l e s s  specialized to 
the individual proc e s s ,  and in these cases there Were fewer benefits 
and some actual costs in n1aintai.ning the existing structure. The
gains from learning by doing fl.owed not only fron-i traditional 
activities, but also from their experience with the less specialized 
machi n e s .  The number of s u c h  mutation s  increased over time. 
As the economies of scale declined (there was no feedback mechanism 
for machines sold to some other firm), and as some organizational 
costs increased (the administration of the producing unit often had 
a comparative disadvantage in m.achi.ne sale s ) ,  the repair and 
maintenance departments tended to spin off into separate machine 
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tool companies. These companies then attempted to capture the 
economies of scale within a different organizational structure. Fee dback 
was frequently provided by salesmen cum technical representative, 
and the gains from learning by doing accrued to the now smaller 
group who were specializing in the production of non-specialized 
machines. 
The written histories of the automobile industry65do not focus
on the slow rate of technical change nor on the almos t  total abse nce 
of expenditures on r e s earch and development, but they do provide 
some, perhaps unintentional, insights into the question of the relation­
ship between institutional structure, returns to s cale, and technical 
progr e s s .  We have already seen that the nature of process innovation 
is such that there may be substantial cost savings if it is undertaken 
by the firm that expects to utilize the process. The auto industry i. s  
really not an auto manufacturing but an auton-iobile a s s embly industry.
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While its ove·rall technical l e a d e r s hi p  is open to question, i.t has 
been among the leaders in innovations relating to a s s e mbly line 
65. John Rae, The Automobile Ind u s t r v  ( Chicago: University
of Chicago P r e s s ,  1 9 6 5 ) .  See al s o ,  Allan Nevins and F. E .  Hi.11, Fo1·d:
The Times, th<:- :t'v1an, the Cornpa!U' ( N e w  York: Charles Scribner1�� 
Son s , 1954). 
66. Jonathan Hughe s ,  _The Vital Few (New York: Oxford 
University Press,  1 9 65) .  
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67 -technique s .  Tnere is no activity where learning by doing is more pro-
ductive than the ass embly proc e s s ,  and even the innovation of the assem­
bly line did not represent an independent breakthrough but merely 
the culmination of a number of small process changes.  Outside of 
assembly techniques, other innovations have tended to come from 
supplying firms, but this division too i s  in line with our general 
understanding of institutional productivity. Those firms are 
specialists in the products they produce, and if there are economies 
of scale in the production of these new products {arising either from 
learning by doing or from feedback s ) ,  they will most likely accrue 
to the spe cializing firm. 
The history of the petroleum industry provides additional 
s upport for the hypothe sis that economies of s cale are sometimes 
as sociated with learning by doing. The established firms were the 
major source of innovation when those were modifications or adap­
tations of existing technologies or even new products that came from 
within the existing paradigm. The farther development moved away 
from existing technologies,  however, the more likely it was to come 
from a source outside the existing large firms. Compare this result 
with the experience of the machine tool con•panies. The evidence 
on the optimal size of research units producing new products i s  
much l e s s  clear. 6 8  Burton Klein argues that the rate of technological 
67. It was Henry Ford who when asked about the source of 
his invention of the a S sembly line said that he had seen a modern 
slaughte r house, thought of it as a disassembly line, and merely 
reve r s ed the proc e s s .  
68. Daniel Hamberg studied the sources of 27 major 
inventions in the period of 1946 to 1 9 5 5  and discovered only 7 were the 
result of research done in large industrial laboratories.  "Invention in 
the Industrial Research Laboratory , "  Journal of Political Economy 
7 1  (April 1 9 6 3 ) p. 9 6 .  Willard J\iueller 1 s work on the origin<:: 
of 2 5  major product and proc e s s  innovations of Dul-Ont between 1 92 0 - 1 9 5 0
revealed that of the 1 8  new products only 5 w e r e  discovered by DuPont. 
11The Origins of the Basic Inventions Underlying Du Pone s Major Produci. 
Innovations. 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 5 0 ,  ' ' in R .  Nelson (ed. ) The Rate and Direction 
of Inventive ActivitY. NEER, { Pri nceton, New Jersey, 1 9 62 } .
progress i s  frequently dependent upon the internal structure of the 
firm and that tightly structured firms are oftentimes less able to 
- th f - k k . f - - 69 h" engage tn e type o ris -ta tng neces sary or innovation. T is
may explain in part why older firni.s which have, in many cases, 
evolved into highly structured organizations re s trict themselves 
to improving and 1:nodifying inventions already in existence rather 
h I . d 70 t an deve oping new pro ucts. 
3. On Product Innovation: Despite the lip service paid 
by historians to growth through product innovation, we know very 
little about the subject. Although a great number of business 
histories have been written, there i s  very little usable industrial 
history on, for example, the polymer industry, the early years of 
the automobile industry, the cornputer industry, nor that portion of 
the electrical industry that was concerned with new product inno­
vation. 70a Further work in these areas should certainly prove 
productive. At the simplest level, it would be very useful to know 
whether the source of innovative activity has come from established 
firms or from newly created enterpris e s .  
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69. Burton Klein, 1 1Competition and Progre s s ' 1  (unpublished 
paper, California Institute of Technology, 1974).  
70. Arthur Stinchcombe, an expert in the area of organi­
zational theory, has examined the relationship between the .date of 
birth of an organization and its present inte rnal structure. Although 
his work may be of no direct use, it suggests that a study of the 
timing of a firm' s entry into a particular sector and its present 
internal structure could prove fruitful in predicting its innovating 
capabilities. See A. Stinchcombe, 11Social Structure and Organizations, " 
in James G .  March {ed. ) Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1 9 65 ) .  In a similar vein Lance E. Davis has explored the 
relationship between date of birth and sources of finance and his 
methodology appears to complen1ent Stinchcomb e 1 s  work. "Sources o·f 
Industrial Finance: The American Textile Industry - A Case Study, 11 
Purdue Faculty Papers in Economic History 1 9 5 6 - 1966 (lllinios: Richard 
D .  Irwin, 1 967).  This type of analy sis could be expanded to an analysis 
of other research institutions (e. g. , universities and non-profit 
laboratories). 
70a. The major exception i s  W. R. Maclaurin1 s study of 
the radio industry. Invention and Innovation i n  the Radio Industry, 
(New York: Macmillan, 1 9 4 9 ) .
A cursory examination of the literature that does exist 
suggests that the results are mixed, but there appears to be some 
economic logic to the institutional division. In the case of polymers, 
existing chemical firms provided the bulk of the technological 
development. These firms already had research groups with the 
skills necessary to exploit developments in chemistry, and they 
should have been able to capture economies arising both from the 
externalities inherent in existing groups and from their ability to 
use those groups both in the new product development and in whatever 
other work was of current interest. Thus they were able to divide an 
otherwise lumpy research investment and operate profitably at a 
lower level of research output than would have been pos s ible for 
any firms not 1 1 i.n the busin e s s .  1 1 In the case of the electric durable 
industry, most product innovation also came from already existing 
firms. W e stinghouse and General Electric together organized the 
Radio Corporation of America and introduced the mas s - produced 
radio receiver. 
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Similarly, those companies took the lead in the 
introduction of refrigerators and washing machines. Both firms had 
a stake in increasing the demand for electric power because the 
succe s s  of the new products would permit them to capture not only 
the direct profits of the innovation but also indirect profits aris�ng 
from their pos ition in the market for electricity and for electric 
generating equipment. Given identical costs, innovation must look 
more profitable to them than to a firm in the position to capture only 
the direct return s .  Costs, however, were not identical, since those 
two firms also had research departments with a stockpile of skills 
at least partly applicable to the new developments. Finally, in the 
case of the auto industry, innovation was by a very large number 
of firms, many new, but a few with origins in coach making. · The 
product w a s  almost entirely new, and not based on a ny development 
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in pure science. Firms in the coach industry had little specialized 
stock of developmental capital, and the other existing industry most 
likely to benefit from the development, petroleum, neither recognized 
7 1 .  Jewkes et al, The Sources of Invention,
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its importance (their major product was kerosene not gasoline), nor 
had any inventory of skills that were particularly relevant. Moreover, 
the technical problems laregly involved only the as sembly of already 
existing components. Under the se conditions, it is likely that existing 
firms had few cost advantages,  and new firrns may have represented the 
institutional technology of choice. 72 These historical vignettes
are interesting, but hardly conclusive. They do, however, suggest 
yet another avenue for potentially productive research. 
Market uncertainty is certainly a barrier to new product 
innovation, but the evidence suggests that the level of profitability 
is also important. Wartime guarantees induced a spate of product 
innovation, but the guaranteed i:narkets for pharmaceuticals that 
resulted from the innovation of the National Health s cheme in Britain 
reduced the amount of new product innovation. 73 In the latter case,
market guarantees were coupled with a change in market structure 
that replaced patent protected r.nonopolies with a bilateral monopoly 
marked by a great deal of bargaining power on the other side of the 
table. In this regard it might be particularly interesting to compare 
DuPont1 s decision to enter the polymer market with its decision to 
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move more heavily into smokeless  powder. Similar comparison 
could be made of, for example, Westinghouse and General Electric r s  
decis ion to enter the radio -industry with their wartime experience 
in radar and sonar, or IBM 1 s  wartime with its peacetime experience. 
These studies could provide the basis for compari.son of the reaction 
of private firms to various gove rnmental market guarantees.  
7 2 .  If creativity declines with age it i s  not surprising that 
it was the Ford Motor Company that first conceived of the $750 car 
and the a s s embly line. Nor should it be surprising that thirty years 
later Ford continued to produce only black auto s .  
7 3 .  Michael H. Cooper, Prices and Profits in the Pharma­
ceutical Industry (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1 9 66), 
74. Although their study does not address this question
directly, Chandler and Salsbury1s work on the DuPont Corporation 
does provide sufficient material to make an analysis of this type of 
decision possible. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Stephen Salsbury 
Pierre S. DuPont and the Making of the Modern Corporation (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1 97 1 ) . 
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4 .  O n  Alternative Organizational Structures :  In the Calculus 
of Conse nt, Buchanan and Tullock categorize organizations as individual, 
voluntary cooperative, and governmental. In this section our focus i s  
on the latter two clas ses.  The " Heroic Age o f  Invention11 has largely 
passed, and from the point of vie w of policy most of the most interesting 
examples Of institutional structures are from one of the "super 
i.ndividualn classes.  These examples provide some insight into the 
research p roductivity of various institutional structures and suggest 
some areas for further research. 
i. Cooperative Research Ventures:  In the late 1 920s a n
attempt w a s  made t o  enlist the support of private firms for a volun�ary 
cooperative venture in basic research. The nascent institution was 
given the august title, 1 1The National Endowment for Sci�nce, 1 1  and 
was launched with vocal support from both the business and political 
communities .  The attempt was almost a total failure. The free rider 
problem proved insuperable. While almost every major corporation 
affirmed the goals of the institution, very few were willing to match 
their words with dollars, and the enterprise passed out of existence 
with the Depression�4arn Great Britain a part of research in the steel
industry is organized on a cooperative basis. 
7 5  
This venture has 
been more succes sful than the NES, although contributions are 
voluntary. The work is jointly supported by government and the 
private sector, and the tied benefits derived from the government's 
contribution are apparently sufficient to i.nduce provate firms to con­
tribute. The structure provides tied benefits similar to the free 
insurance that has proven so necessary in holding together other 
75.  (About fourteen percent in 1 9 6 3 . ) See, J. A. Allen, 
Studies in .Innovation in the Steel and Chemical Industries (New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1968),  pp. 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 .  
74a. See Lance Davis and Daniel Kevles, 1 1 The National R e search 
Fund: A Case Study in the Industrial Support of Academic Science, 1 1 
Minerva, forthcoming. 
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voluntary cooperative groups {for example, nineteenth century trade 
unions and the American Medical As sociation), In G ermany, 
cooperative research in steel has been even more succes sful; however, 
in that country the organization has the power to tax its members. 
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A survey of these three structures suggests that, in the absence of 
some coercive power, the free rider problem makes cooperative 
ventures economically unfeasible unle s s  the research is so specialized 
that the gains to a single (or sn-i.all set of) firm(s) is sufficient to pay 
all the costs. Even if the legal problems were solved and cooperative 
ventures granted coercive powers over their members, the structure 
would likely prove useful only in industries characterized by few 
firms and substantial barriers to entry. 
ii, Government Guarantees of the Demand for Final Out�t: 
Radar and penicillin provide impres s ive examples of the speed at 
which technical advance can take place when the profitability of the 
advance is guaranteed. But technical advance in the engineering 
sense cannot be the goal of any reasonable policy. In the wartime 
case, the government as the consumer of final or intermediate 
products had some notion of the productivity of the advances in 
question, although the history of American planes, tanks, and torpedos 
suggests that, even in those instances, the productivity signals were 
not very good. If: is less  clear that there exists a structure to provide 
a set of signals about the differential productivity of technical progre s s  
i n  areas where the government is not a market participant: It i s  not 
clear, for example, that the signals produced by the parity price 
program i.n agriculture led to a n  optimal mix of research and develop­
ment expenditures. Research on this question might involve a more 
76. The Verein Deutsher Eisenhutteleute. See Allen, Studies
in Innovation. 
careful study of the wide range of historical experience, perhaps 
the development of anti - smog devices or even of railroad land 
grants in the nineteenth century. 
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iii. Socialization of the Re search and Development Function:
The history of the Department of Agriculture suggests that socialized 
research has, in that area at least, been productive. Even i.n that 
instance, however, we have no clear measure of the meaning of 
11productive, 1 1  since we know little about what might have been achieved 
if the same resources had been deployed in a different manner, In a 
similar vein, a cursory reading of wartime and postwar experience 
might be used to support the view that government sponsored research 
has also been 11highly productive. '1 Government funded research 
laboratories both here and in Britain produced a wide variety of new 
products during the war, and in the past decade and a half NASA has 
managed to land a man on the moon and send a rocket to Mars . In 
few of these cases,  however, has there been any attempt to match 
costs against revenues, and in some instances the evidence suggests 
that the net productivity may have been zero even if the costs had 
been at that level as well. Operation Habakkuk (th� two-mile long 
Pykecrete ship) seems to fall into the latter category. On the other 
hand, man·y of the new products did help shorten the war, and the 
heavily funded British and American research operations seem to 
have been more productive than tho s e  in Germany where the commit­
ment to socialized res earch was le s s .  The question of productivity 
signals leads to the question of the research departments'  decision 
criteria. \\'hen research is socialized, the usual division is after all 
a political unit, and it is likely to respond to its constituents. As we 
have seen in the case of the Department of Agriculture, the goals 
of that constituency are not neces sarily the goals of society. In 
particular, the political links appear to produce a research bias 
towards proce s s  as opposed to product development. The constituents 
prefer research that bestows extra profits on their capital stock 
and oppose development that makes that s tock obsolete. In addition, 
they are interested in maximizing their income, not in supporting 
developments whose benefits might accrue to someone else. Finally, 
to the extent that the constituents ' discount rate is above society' s ,  
there is a natural tendency t o  favor change that is more immediately 
profitable (in  the case of research, frequently process rather than 
product development), In the case of the agricultural sector, at 
least, the farme r s 1  behavior suggests a very high rate of dis count. 
Given the ambiguity of the evidence, more clarity might 
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be provided if some future research were to focus not on military 
R &D {where the problems of providing adequate productivity measure ­
ment must be clos·e to insuperable),  but on the histories of the 
Department of Agriculture, the J'Jational Science Foundation, and the 
National Institute of Health. 
iv. R e search Produced. as a Joint Product: A s ignificant
quantity of research has been produced as a by-product of government 
expenditure s .  Although the wartime experiences come irrunediately 
to mind, the process antedates even the first World War. In the 
early nineteenth century, many of the civil engineering developments 
that underwrote the construction of the railroad network were sub-
77 sidized by the government i n  its efforts to train military engineers, 
and half a century later it was the Bureau of the Census that helped 
pay for the development of the earliest precurser of the modern 
computer. Moreover, the political rhetoric over private appropri­
ability has been substantial. Putting aside questions of welfare, we 
know very little about the mechanism of 11by-product research" nor 
has there even been a systematic census of the improvements that 
have been financed in this fashion. The structure is inherently an 
interesting one, since some signals of the productivity of the primary 
77. Daniel Calhoun, Arnerican Civil Engineer: Origins an� 
Conflict (Cambridge, Mas s . : IIarvard University Pres s ,  1 960). 
activity at least are available, and it appears fruitful as an object 
for further research. It seems useful to attempt to explain techno­
logical spinoffs by relating those spinoffs to some policy variable 
(e. g. , to the method of financing research, to the structure of the 
industries involved, or the system of letting the original contracts) 
in some s ystematic fashion. In short, is it possible to explain why 
twenty years of expenditure on space research, largely of the high 
technology variety, has produced only Corningware? 
45 
Economic historians have been concerned with technical 
change, but their work is subject to the same weakne s s e s ,  criticisms 
and lack of operationality that i s  characteristic of the work of other 
economists working on the same problem. The body of literature they 
have produced, however, provides an important data source for 
studies attempting to link institutional development to technical 
change� The focus has, however, been on process changes, and 
new product innovation has not re ceived the attention it deserves. 
In fact, the Schumpeter-Kuznets debate over the relative importance 
of product and proc e s s  innovation has still to be resolved. Further­
more, while the work of Ames and Enos has suggested, for at least 
a subset of these questions, that these questions might be better 
answered with engineering data rather than patents, work along these 
lines has hardly begun. 
D e s pite these caveats, it appears that, if understanding 
the relationship between institutions and technology is the goal, 
economic history provides a fruitful area for further research. The 
costs of organizing the existing lhork which bring to bear on the primary 
question should be both inexpensive and productive. Extensions into 
periods and industries not already covered would be more costly, but 
given the focus provided by recent theory and the ability to narrow 
that focus to those areas not otherwise covered, that project is probably 
eco_nomically viable as well. In short, the structure provided by 
economic historians appears to provide a heretofore largely ignored 
but potentially productive technology for further research i.nto the 
institutional aspects of the pro·c-es s  of technical change. 
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